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Why Transnational Law Matters
Harold Hongju Koh*
What is transnational law and why does it matter? Transnational
law represents a hybrid of domestic and international law that has
assumed increasing significance in our lives. Let me address why
transnational law is important, and then turn to some emerging trends,
which I call transnational legal process, transnational legal substance,
and the rise of transnational public law. I will close by considering ways
in which legal education and American law schools should act to keep
pace with the ascendancy of transnational law.
In his 1956 Storrs Lectures, Judge Philip Jessup famously defined
"transnational law" as "all law which regulates actions or events that
transcend national frontiers ... [including] [b]oth public and private
international law... [plus] other rules which do not wholly fit into such
standard categories."' Perhaps the best summary of the extant doctrines
of transnational law can be found in the American Law Institute's
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.2 One might think of
transnational law as law that is neither purely domestic nor purely
international, but rather, a hybrid of the two. Consider, for example, the
metric system or the Internet business concept of "dot.com." Are these
domestic or international concepts? Of course, the intuitive answer is
neither. Both are hybrids, purely transnational ideas.
Perhaps the best operational definition of transnational law, using
computer-age imagery, is: (1) law that is "downloaded" from
international to domestic law: for example, an international law concept
* Dean and Gerard C. & Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law,
Yale Law School; Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor,
1998-2001. This essay is a footnoted version of remarks delivered at the plenary session
on "What Is Transnational Law And Why Does It Matter?" at the 2006 AALS Annual
Meeting in Washington, D.C. on January 4, 2006 and shares thoughts with Harold
Hongju Koh, The Ninth Annual John W. Hager Lecture, The 2004 Term: The Supreme
Court Meets International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (2005). I am very
grateful to Kate Desormeau of the Yale Law School class of 2008 for her outstanding
research assistance.
1. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956).
2. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1987).
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that is domesticated or internalized into municipal law, such as the
international human rights norm against disappearance, now recognized
as domestic law in most municipal systems; (2) law that is "uploaded,
then downloaded": for example, a rule that originates in a domestic legal
system, such as the guarantee of a free trial under the concept of due
process of law in Western legal systems, which then becomes part of
international law, as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and from there
becomes internalized into nearly every legal system in the world; and
(3) law that is borrowed or "horizontally transplanted" from one national
system to another: for example, the "unclean hands" doctrine, which
migrated from the British law of equity to many other legal systems.
Today, the concept of transnational law embraces a range of law
school courses thought to be neither purely domestic nor international,
neither purely public nor private, for example: Comparative Law,
Immigration and Refugee Law, International Business Transactions,
International Commercial Law, International Trade Law, Foreign
Relations Law, National Security Law, Law of Cyberspace, Law and
Development, Environmental Law, and the Law of Transnational
Crimes. In each of these legal areas, global standards have become fully
recognized, integrated, and internalized into domestic legal systems
To understand how transnational law works, one must understand
"Transnational Legal Process": the transubstantive process in each of
these issue areas whereby states and other transnational private actors use
the blend of domestic and international legal process to internalize
international legal norms into domestic law.3 As I have argued
elsewhere, key agents in promoting this process of internalization include
transnational norm entrepreneurs, governmental norm sponsors,
transnational issue networks, and interpretive communities.4 In this
story, one of these agents triggers an interaction at the international level,
works together with other agents of internalization to force an
3. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture:
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181 (1996); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do
Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); OONA HATHAWAY &
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 173-204
(2006).
4. Transnational legal process highlights the interactions among both private
citizens, whom I call "transnational norm entrepreneurs," and governmental officials,
whom I call "governmental norm sponsors." The interaction among transnational norm
entrepreneurs and governmental norm sponsors create transnational networks and law-
declaring fora, which create new rules of international law that are construed by
interpretive communities. Through the work of these "agents of internalization," these
international law rules trickle down from the international level and become domesticated
into national law. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture:
Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998).
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interpretation of the international legal norm in an interpretive forum,
and then continues to work with those agents to persuade a resisting
nation-state to internalize that interpretation into domestic law. Through
repeated cycles of "interaction-interpretation-internalization,"
interpretations of applicable global norms are eventually internalized into
states' domestic legal systems.
To illustrate, consider the ancient law of the law merchant ("lex
mercatoria"). Originally developed as a form of business regulation
among merchants in the Mediterranean, English merchants brought the
customs, principles, and rules of lex mercatoria to England where they
became incorporated into the English common law.5 From there, this
body of law migrated to the New World to become part of American
common law.6 Through the enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which sought to codify existing mercantile custom, in forty nine
states and the District of Columbia, lex mercatoria entered state statutory
law. It then became treaty law as part of the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for International Sale of Goods, which entered into force for
the United States on January 1, 1988. 7 Thus, the transnational legal
process story of lex mercatoria shows that it was domesticated through
an historical process whereby it began as transnational custom, mutated
into domestic common law, was transplanted to another national system,
was codified into domestic statutory law, and finally was uploaded into
international treaty law, which is also federal law in the United States.
Transnational law matters because it increasingly influences laws
and policies that govern us, particularly when international law and
policies become domesticated into U.S. law and policies. Take, for
example, the recent, intense public debate over the domestication of the
international norm against torture. The Bush Administration has battled
over whether or not the norm against torture has in fact been internalized
into executive practice, but President Bush has recently conceded that, as
a matter of executive branch policy, the President cannot in fact order
torture. 8 On the legislative side, the McCain Amendment to the most
5. See Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial
Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 224-29 (1978).
6. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (clarifying that the bill of
exchange rules derived from lex mercatoria constituted part of the "general common
law" to be interpreted by federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction).
7. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISGI. By operation of the Supremacy
Clause, the CISG overrides the UCC with respect to contracts for the sale of goods
between parties whose places of business are in different contracting states.
8. In January 2006, President Bush stated unambiguously: "I don't think a president
can ... order torture, for example .... Yes, there are clear red lines .. " Interview by
Bob Schieffer, CBS News, with President George W. Bush, in Washington, D.C. (Jan.
27, 2006), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/01/27/eveningnews/
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recent Department of Defense Authorization Act explicitly internalized
the norm against torture.9 Moreover, since 1980, the federal courts of the
United States have held that torture constitutes a tort in violation of the
law of nations. 10 Notwithstanding these varied efforts, at this writing, a
controversy still reigns over whether and to what extent the United States
government has genuinely foresworn the use of torture as an
interrogation device in the war on terror.
A similar controversy rages over the permissible uses of
international law in interpreting domestic law. Over the decades,
American judges have helped to internalize international legal norms into
U.S. domestic law through a range of interpretive techniques, including:
(1) constitutional interpretation," (2) treaty interpretation,12
(3) incorporation of customary international law into domestic law,
(4) direct statutory interpretation of statutes that expressly incorporate
international law, (5) indirect statutory interpretation in accordance with
the so-called "Charming Betsy" canon, which requires courts to construe
ambiguous federal statutes to comport with governing rules of
international law,1 3 and finally (6) by interpreting state law in light of
rules of international law. Through these varied interpretive techniques,
federal judges have become an increasingly critical link between the
main1248952_page3.shtml. For a review of the effort to internalize the norm against
torture into U.S. law, see Harold Hongju Koh, "Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?"
81 IND. L.J. 1145 (2005).
9. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148,
Div. A, tit. X, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-40 (2005) ("No individual in the custody or
under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or
physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment."). The previous Defense Authorization Act stated that "[iut is the policy of
the United States to-() ensure that no detainee shall be subject to torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment that is prohibited by the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 1091(b)(1), 118 Stat.
1811, 2068 (2004).
10. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
11. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (referencing international
norms and practices in holding unconstitutional executions of offenders who were under
the age of eighteen when their crime was committed); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692 (2004) (discussing status of customary international law as federal common law);
Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004) (interpreting the Warsaw Convention);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (referencing international norms and practices in
holding unconstitutional the criminalization of consensual, adult, private, same-sex
sodomy); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (referencing international norms and
practices in holding unconstitutional executions of mentally retarded offenders).
12. See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004); Gonzales v. 0
Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006).
13. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 84, 118 (1804)
("An act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains.").
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international and the domestic legal spheres. During the last several
terms, the Court has heard more cases involving transnational legal
issues than ever before, reflecting the growing globalization of our
national activities.14
When addressing these issues, as I have noted elsewhere, the
Supreme Court has now divided into transnationalist and nationalist
factions, which hold sharply divergent attitudes toward transnational
law. 15  The transnationalist faction-which includes Justices Breyer,
Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and at times, Justice Kennedy-tends to
follow an approach suggested by Justice Blackmun in the late 1980s:
that U.S. courts must look beyond national interest to the "mutual
interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning international legal
regime" and must "consider if there is a course that furthers, rather than
impedes, the development of an ordered international system."1 6  In
contrast, another group of Justices, which includes the new Chief Justice
John Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito,1 7 seems committed
to a more nationalist course.
Generally speaking, the transnationalists tend to emphasize the
interdependence between the United States and the rest of the world,
while the nationalists tend instead to focus more on preserving American
autonomy. The transnationalists believe in and promote the blending of
international and domestic law; while nationalists continue to maintain a
rigid separation of domestic from foreign law. The transnationalists
view domestic courts as having a critical role to play in domesticating
international law into U.S. law, while nationalists argue instead that only
the political branches can internalize international law. The
transnationalists believe that U.S. courts can and should use their
interpretive powers to promote the development of a global legal system,
while the nationalists tend to claim that U.S. courts should limit their
attention to the development of a national system. Finally, the
transnationalists urge that the power of the executive branch should be
constrained by judicial review and the concept of international comity,
14. See cases cited in Koh, Hager Lecture, supra note *, at 3-4, from which this
discussion is drawn.
15. Id. at 5-6.
16. Socit Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U. S. Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 555,
567 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
17. In their recent nomination hearings, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
were asked several questions about the application of international and foreign law to
U.S. law, and both suggested that they were clearly in the nationalist camp. Confirmation
Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 370 (2005);
Confirmation Hearing on Samuel Alito To Be Associate Justice of the United States:
Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 370 (2006).
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while the nationalists tend to believe that federal courts should give
extraordinarily broad deference to executive power in foreign affairs.
Why does this difference in judicial philosophies matter? First,
because the transnationalist/nationalist debate is gaining public visibility;
witness, for example, the recent debate between Justices Breyer and
Scalia on the topic at American University.' 8 Second, this increasingly
visible public debate not only explains much of the ongoing struggle in
particular transnational cases, but also seems likely to decide the U.S.
courts' future orientation toward the phenomenon of globalization as it
presents itself in a wider range of cases. Third, this is an issue that
crosses partisan political lines. Notably, three of the transnationalists-
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Kennedy-are Republican appointees.
With Justices Roberts and Alito now seemingly poised to join the
nationalist camp, the transnationalist-nationalist split increasingly hinges
on Justice Kennedy's pivotal vote, with the next Supreme Court
appointment after Justice Alito most likely to determine the Court's
future course on these issues. Yet oddly, although any newly appointed
Justices will play this pivotal role with respect to law and globalization,
both the Roberts and Alito confirmation hearings were unusually
weighted toward the new Justices' potential impact on "yesterday's
issues"-federalism and social issues, such as abortion, gay rights,
religion, and affirmative action-rather than on tomorrow's issues,
particularly the role of U.S. law and courts in a global era of technology
and innovation.
And what do these changes in evolving American law portend for
American legal education? As I have argued elsewhere, if transnational
law will loom so large in our future, we need to teach our students more
transnational law, not just transnational legal process but also what I call
"Transnational Legal Substance." 19 We know about the transnational
private law that has emerged in a variety of areas, such as the new lex
mercatoria, international finance, international banking law, and the law
of cyberspace. But the most visible trend in transnational substantive
law has been the emergence of what I call "transnational public law." In
the same way as the focus of the twentieth century law school gradually
shifted from the teaching of private law toward the teaching of public
law, the major change in the twenty-first century will similarly be toward
such topics in transnational public law as the law of global democracy,
18. See Justice Stephen Breyer & Justice Antonin Scalia, Discussion on
Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005) (transcript available
at http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B8
10071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocument).
19. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 305
(2001).
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the law of global governance, the law of transnational crime, the law of
transnational injury and redress, the law of regulation of transnational
markets, and the law of transnational dispute resolution, to name just a
few topics.
To address these global trends, American law schools will need to
reform their traditional legal curriculum, their faculties and their
scholarship, their students, and other aspects of legal education. Some
schools have addressed curricular change by requiring international or
transnational law courses, but at Yale Law School, our approach has
been to mainstream a focus on globalization into our traditional First
Term Curriculum, adding international modules in the basic courses of
Procedure, Torts, Constitutional Law, and Contracts.
In rethinking the first year law school curriculum, one could
imagine a course in contract that includes, alongside traditional domestic
doctrine, a discussion of Transnational Contracts: for example, oil
development agreements between multinational oil companies and
developing nations, governed by the U.N. Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods.20  The torts course could add a
discussion of Transnational Torts, both mass disasters such as the
Bhopal tragedy and civil litigation of crimes against humanity and "torts
in violation of the law of nations" under the Alien Tort Claims Act.21
The basic criminal law course could be modified to include a module on
such Transnational Crimes as terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in
persons, and international criminal litigation in domestic courts, such as
the Lockerbie or Pinochet cases. In my own basic first-term course in
Procedure, I teach several weeks on topics in Transnational Procedure,
including transnational public law litigation22 and the ALI/UNIDROIT
Principles and Rules of Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure, which
represent cross-cutting transnational procedural rules on jurisdiction,
venue, service of process, the taking of evidence, and the recognition of
judgments.23 Similarly, property courses could include modules on
Transnational Property-for example, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) rules on protection of intellectual property-and there is already
a rich body of teaching materials on Comparative Constitutional Law.24
At the upper levels, we also now recommend that most of our
20. See CISG, supra note 7.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1350; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)
(stating test for what kinds of torts are actionable under this statute).
22. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
2347 (1991).
23. American Law Institute & UNIDROIT, Principles and Rules of Transnational
Civil Procedure (2005).
24. See generally VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999).
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students take a First-Year, Second-Term course in Transnational Law, to
shift the students' minds from the largely domestic first-year curriculum
into a transnational mindset. A more comprehensive advanced
transnational law curriculum would include additional transnational
courses and seminars that deal with current topics of student and faculty
interest, clinical courses that prepare students for global legal practice,
and the broader objective of enhancing the global awareness of our
students by requiring more entering J.D. students to have foreign
language fluency or overseas travel experience as qualifications for
admission.
We should not overlook the need to globalize other aspects of our
law school agenda as well: particularly faculty, scholarship and other
law school programs. Our faculties can be diversified by increasing the
numbers of foreign visiting professors, programs of faculty and student
exchanges, expanded programs on regional law (in Latin America, the
Middle East, China, and South Asia), and more career services to prepare
students for global practice. We might also create international
concentrations in our graduate programs, such as on foreign tax and
international human rights, and emphasize the importance of cross-
disciplinary, transnational scholarship. Our larger goal is to promote the
building of worldwide networks of graduates-J.D.s, LL.M.s, as well as
J.S.D. graduates who return to teach and practice in their home
countries-with the eventual goal of using those human networks to
move toward deeper partnerships and perhaps even joint degree
programs with leading foreign law schools.
Finally, information networks are a critical part of the global future.
In our library at Yale, for example, we are increasingly focusing on
shared global library databases with common portals on the World Wide
Web, such as our online human rights archive (the Diana Project).25
Similarly, our Schell Center for Human Rights26 has also joined in a
partnership with several other institutions to create the Artemis Project
for Truth Commission Testimonies, 27 which is designed to create a
unified database where researchers can find cross-cultural data regarding
the several dozen truth and reconciliation commissions that have been
conducted around the world.
There is much more that can be said, but it should be obvious by
25. See Project Diana, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diana/ (last visited Dec.
4, 2006).
26. See Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights,
http://www.law.yale.edu/intellectuallife/abouttheschelcenter.htm (last visited Dec. 4,
2006).
27. See Artemis Project for Truth Commission Testimonies,
http://www.law.yale.edu/trc/artemis.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2006).
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now that transnational law clearly matters. Transnational law represents
a kind of hybrid between domestic and international law that can be
downloaded, uploaded, or transplanted from one national system to
another. Transnational law is becoming increasingly important because
it increasingly governs and influences our lives, particularly during an
increasingly contentious war on terror. Not only does transnational law
already represent a growing part of the Supreme Court's docket, but in a
new millennium, the study of transnational law will soon also affect and
be reflected in all aspects of our legal education.

